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Abstract: The negotiation and conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) has generated fierce controversy and political protest 
around the globe. Its main aim is the improvement of the domestic enforcement 
of intellectual property (IP) rights. This paper analyzes in detail the secretive 
negotiation process and controversial substantive features of ACTA that have 
led to global political resistance. It considers the legal issues that the treaty 
brings to the key signatories, both substantively and procedurally: the 
European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.), thereby considering 
international, supranational and domestic legal questions. This includes an 
examination of the changes that ACTA brings to the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), whether ACTA 
complies with the existing EU legislation on copyright appropriately (EU 
acquis) and questions surrounding the constitutionality of ACTA under U.S. 
Constitutional law. We argue that the danger of ACTA lies less in the actual 
substantive changes that it may bring to the enforcement of IP rights than in the 
precedent that it sets for the adoption of controversial and restrictive 
regulation in secretive and exclusive international procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a plurilateral treaty, 
which aims to improve the domestic enforcement of intellectual property (IP) 
rights, including on the Internet. The amount of counterfeit and pirated 
goods in international trade grew steadily over the period 2000-2007 and 
could amount to up to USD $250 billion in 2007 — accounting for 1.95% in 
total world trade.1 
Counterfeiting and piracy have an immediate impact on IP right holders, 
and, in the medium and long terms, arguably produce a wide range of 
effects on consumers, industry, government, and the economy as a whole.2 
Despite its statement that the effective enforcement of IP rights is “critical” 
to sustaining economic growth across all industries and globally,3 ACTA 
has generated fierce controversy at the national, European, and global 
levels.4 Opponents challenge the agreement’s high level of public attention 
drawn by the treaty’s implications for individual rights, calling it 
                                                 
* Associate professor, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance, 
University of Amsterdam. Emile Nöl Fellow 2012/2013, New York University. 
** Post-doctoral researcher, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance, 
University of Amsterdam. 
*** Post-doctoral researcher, Amsterdam Center for International Law, University of 
Amsterdam. 
 
The authors thank Vigjilenca Abazi, Chris Koedooder, James Mathis, Ana Ramalho, 
and Sakao Yuichi for their helpful comments to earlier versions of this paper, and 
Margot de Vries for her research assistance. 
 
1
 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [hereinafter OECD], 
Magnitude of Counterfeiting and Piracy: An Update, 1 (2009), 
http://www.oecd.org/industry/industryandglobalisation/44088872.pdf. (discussing that 
these figures do not include domestically produced and consumed products and, more 
importantly, non-tangible pirated digital products which could add several hundred 
billion dollars to the amount); see Piotr Stryszowski, OECD, Counterfeiting and Piracy: 
Statistics and Data Gathering, slide 7 (2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/observatory/oecd_en.pdf. 
2
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [hereinafter GAO], GAO-10-423, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 9 (2010), available at 
http://gao.gov/new.items/d10423.pdf. 
3
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature Oct. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 
243, pmbl. [hereinafter ACTA], available at 
http://mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf. 
4
 Timothy Lee, As Anonymous Protests, Internet Drowns in Inaccurate Anti-ACTA 
Arguments, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 30, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/01/internet-awash-in-inaccurate-anti-acta-arguments/. 
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3 
mismatched with the low level of transparency pursued by the negotiating 
parties.5 This secrecy created by a gap between information demand and 
supply in treaty making is one of the core reasons of suspicion toward 
ACTA. 
The substantive content of ACTA is of as much interest as the process 
evolving it. Strong concerns have been expressed with regard to the freedom 
of expression, right to information, the protection of personal data and the 
right to fair and due process.6 Critics of ACTA have argued that it will 
expose private parties, including Internet Service Providers, to criminal 
charges for aiding and abetting those who act to breach the IP rights of 
others. 7  ACTA’s ambiguous language could bring a number of notable 
changes to civil, border, and criminal procedures at the domestic level, 
which would also have effects upon the transnational flows of goods and 
information. An opinion issued in April 2012 by the European Data 
Protection Supervisor suggested that ACTA does not give the right 
incentives to national legislators to transpose it appropriately. 8 
Notwithstanding, standards set out in ACTA are likely to be used in bilateral 
and multilateral trade negotiations.  
Political narratives surrounding ACTA have become increasingly 
ambivalent. Some signatories have started to emphasize not only the 
                                                 
5
 See David S. Levine, Transparency Soup: The ACTA Negotiating Process and “Black 
Box” Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 811, 829-30 (2011). 
6
 Legal Opinion, Legal Serv., EUR. PARL., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) – Conformity with European Union Law, ¶ 28, SJ-0661/11, (2011) [hereinafter 
Legal Opinion], available at http://actafacts.com/files/SJ-0661-
11_Legal%20Opinion.pdf. 
7
 See Margot Kaminski, An Overview of the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), PIJIP Research Paper No. 17, 19 (2011); Kimberlee Weatherall, 
Politics, Compromise, Text and the Failures of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 229, 243 (2011); see also Olivia Solon, British MEP 
David Martin Urges ACTA Rejection, WIRED.CO.UK (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http://wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-04/13/david-martin-mep-urges-acta-rejection. 
8
 European Data Prot. Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor 
on the proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of 
Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the 
United States of America, ¶ 35 (2012), available at 
http://edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/
Opinions/2012/12-04-24_ACTA_EN.pdf; see generally European Data Prot. 
Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the current 
negotiations by the European Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), OJ C 147/1 (2010), available at 
http://edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/
Opinions/2010/10-02-22_ACTA_EN.pdf. 
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importance of the treaty, but also, ironically, its insignificance. The 
European Commission argued that the substantive level of protection of 
property rights in ACTA is the same as currently under EU law.9 Similarly, 
the limited impact of ACTA on existing U.S. law is advocated by the U.S. 
Trade Representative. 10  The European Commission further assured that 
ACTA will only be used against large-scale crime and will not affect the 
everyday use of the Internet.11 
Against such a political backdrop, this article attempts to reflect upon major 
legal issues surrounding the negotiation and adoption of ACTA from the 
international, EU, and U.S. legal perspectives – in particular changes to 
existing enforcement of IP rights and the secrecy of the adoption process. 
International, regional, and domestic regulation of IP rights has always 
involved a complex balancing exercise between the protection of IP rights 
demanded by right holders and developed states, and the safeguarding of the 
access to goods and services by users and developing countries. Any 
significant changes to the existing balance between competing social 
interests would have to be done through the deliberation process in which a 
wide range of constituencies can participate. The controversies surrounding 
ACTA indicate that the treaty fails both to involve the relevant stakeholders 
and to balance competing international, regional, and domestic interests in 
IP rights protection. 
Part I analyses in detail the negotiation process and substantive features of 
ACTA by situating it within broader attempts to reform the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) concluded in 
1994.12 Thereafter, the article considers the legal issues that the treaty brings 
to the key signatories, both substantively and procedurally: the EU and the 
U.S., thereby considering international, regional and domestic negotiation 
and ratification legal questions. From the EU law standpoint, Part II 
addresses in detail the question of whether ACTA complies with the 
existing EU legislation on copyright appropriately (EU acquis). Questions 
                                                 
9
 EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA): 
FACT SHEET 2, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140836.11.08.pdf (last 
modified Nov. 2008) [hereinafter ACTA Fact Sheet]. 
10
 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., The Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative Releases Statement of ACTA Negotiating Partners on Recent ACTA 
Negotiations (Aug. 2010), http://ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2010/august/office-us-trade-representative-releases-statement-a. 
11
 ACTA Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 2. 
12
 See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (The Treaty is Annex 1C of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization). 
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surrounding the constitutionality of ACTA under U.S. Constitutional law 
are outlined in Part III, by way of a comparative analysis of the reception of 
international law in one key signatory’s domestic legal order.  
 
I. ACTA AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF IP RIGHTS 
According to the preamble,13 ACTA is designed to “complement” TRIPS, 
the multilateral IP rights protection agreement annexed to the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). 14  A treaty may be 
regarded as complementary if it shares the same objectives with another 
treaty. At the abstract level, ACTA indeed complements TRIPS, in that it 
likewise pursues effective protection and enforcement of IP rights and the 
objectives and principles set forth in TRIPS generally apply to ACTA.15 It 
does not allow parties to exonerate their obligations under TRIPS amongst 
themselves.16 However, in more concrete terms, the drafting procedure and 
substantive provisions of ACTA contradict its allegedly complementary 
character. ACTA seeks to complement TRIPS’ objectives, but it does so as 
a form of critique to the 1994 multilateral regime, as well as to those WTO 
members which, in the view of ACTA negotiating states, have not 
effectively implemented enforcement provisions.  
 
A. On Procedure: International Standard-Setting via Non-
WTO Forums 
1. Adopting ACTA; Another “TRIPS-Plus” Treaty 
ACTA was drafted among like-minded states outside the WTO framework 
and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a multilateral 
forum focused on the IP protection. After the Japanese Prime Minister 
raised the concept of a plurilateral ACTA at the Gleneagles G8 Summit in 
2005,17  a series of preliminary negotiations took place among an initial 
                                                 
13
 ACTA, supra note 3, at pmbl. ¶ 4. 
14
 See generally TRIPS, supra note 12 (detailing the text of TRIPS). 
15
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 2, ¶¶ 1-3. 
16
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 1. 
17
 Group of Eight [G8], Gleneagles Summit, Reducing IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting 
Through More Effective Enforcement (2005), 
http://mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2005/piracy.pdf.; see generally Peter Yu, Six 
Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 980-98 (2011). 
Forthcoming in: Currents, International Trade Law Journal (2012), vol. 20(2), pp. 20-44. 
6 
group of interested parties (including Canada, European Union, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland, and United States), starting in 
October 2007. 18  Eleven meetings were held among a broader, but still 
restricted, circle of participants.19 The negotiating states and the EU have 
only released scarce information twice: a “Summary of Key Elements Under 
Discussion” in 2009, and a “Fact Sheet” in 2010.20 However, the draft text 
of the treaty remained undisclosed until after the eighth meeting in April 
2010.21 Six months after the release of the draft text, the participants reached 
an overall agreement,22 leading to the finalization of the treaty provisions in 
December 2010.23  The treaty was then finalized on April 15, 2011 and 
opened for signature on May 1, 2011.24 
The choice of the non-WTO forum is apparently to avoid the multilateral 
stalemate on domestic enforcement.25 From the moment of its creation at the 
Uruguay Round, TRIPS accommodates a profound division of opinions 
                                                 
18
 Proposed US ACTA Plurilateral Intellectual Property Trade Agreement (2007), 
WIKILEAKS, (May 22, 2008), 
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Proposed_US_ACTA_plurilateral_intellectual_property_trade
_agreement_%282007%29 (detailing the informal meetings held in December 2007 
and in January and March 2008. The discussion document during the initial talks in 
2007 was first leaked by WikiLeaks on May 22, 2008); see Levine, Transparency Soup, 
supra note 5, at 829-30. 
19
 UNITED KINGDOM DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, ACTA NEGOTIATING ROUNDS, http://ipo.gov.uk/acta-
rounds.doc (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
20
 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTA – SUMMARY OF 
KEY ELEMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION (2009), http://ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-
sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-elements-under-discussion; OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. TRADE REP., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTA FACT SHEET (Mar. 2010), 
http://ustr.gov/acta-fact-sheet-march-2010. 
21
 Consolidated Text Prepared for Public Release, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011 (PUBLIC Predecisional/Deliberative Draft Apr. 2010) 
[hereinafter Public Release ACTA], available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf. 
22
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011 (Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft Oct. 2010), available at http://ustr.gov/webfm_send/2338 (reflecting changes 
made during the Sept. 2010 Tokyo Round). 
23
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011 (Draft Subject to Legal Review 
Nov. 2010), available at http://mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/trade-
agreement1011.pdf (discussing that the text was finalized in November 2010, subject 
to legal review).  
24
 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, http://international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/fo/intellect_property.aspx?view=d (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
25
 Weatherall, supra note 7, at 237. 
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among members.26 Developing states originally preferred IP to be governed 
within the WIPO, as opposed to the WTO, with its institutionalized dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 27  In the asymmetrical power structure of 
multilateral trade negotiations, developing states agreed to compromise in 
exchange for concessions on other issues such as agriculture and textiles in 
the WTO agreements.28  
Domestic enforcement of TRIPS was one of the points that divided the 
opinions between industrialized IP exporters and developing IP importers. 
The efforts to reach an agreement led Part III of TRIPS, entitled 
“Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,”29 to accommodate significant 
flexibilities and limitations. 30  The position of developing countries is 
reflected particularly in Article 41(5) of TRIPS, which states that members 
are not obligated to set up a judicial system or to change the distribution of 
resources for IP rights enforcement.31 Article 41(5) leaves greater flexibility 
to states in terms of the specific modes of enforcement. The provision is in 
line with Article 1(1) of TRIPS, which states that members are free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementation within their own legal 
system and practice. 32  Developing countries consider Articles 41(5) and 
1(1) the key concession they won through the TRIPS negotiation process.33 
For IP exporters, TRIPS has thus left much to be desired. The development 
                                                 
26
 See HIROKO YAMANE, INTERPRETING TRIPS: GLOBALISATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 105-47 (2011) (providing a detailed 
account of the Uruguay Round negotiations leading to the adoption of TRIPS). 
27
 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 79 (2004). 
28
 SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 173 (2003); Bryan Mercurio, Beyond the Text: The 
Significance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 361, 
362-63 (2012). 
29
 See generally YAMANE, supra note 26, at 175-80 (providing an overview of Part III). 
30
 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 482 
(2011) (providing the background and analysis of TRIPS’ enforcement provisions). 
31
 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 41(5) (“It is understood that this Part does not create 
any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it 
affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Part 
creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as between 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement of law in general”) 
(emphasis added). 
32
 TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 1(1); see also YAMANE, supra note 26, at 16. 
33
 Yu, supra note 30, at 496. 
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of the Internet has further augmented the ineffectiveness of TRIPS, which 
does not contain specific rules on internet-related copyright protection.34  
To resolve the dissatisfaction towards Part III of TRIPS, many developed 
countries have started to incorporate “TRIPS-plus” provisions in their free 
trade agreements (FTAs).35 ACTA must be understood as a continuation of 
these “TRIPS-plus” processes. 36  After the aforementioned G8 Summit, 
developed states made diplomatic efforts to pursue the enforcement agenda 
at the WTO forum. From June 2005 to October 2007, proposals to discuss 
the effective implementation of enforcement provisions of TRIPS were 
tabled by the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States.37 
                                                 
34
 YAMANE, supra note 26, at 151, 158 (discussing the internet-related procedures, such 
as measures against circumvention of technological measures to protect IP right 
holders, have been separately covered by the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, known together as the 1996 WIPO 
Internet Treaties); see generally World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (entered into force Mar. 6, 2002); World 
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 
1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (entered into force May 20, 2002). 
35
 See YAMANE, supra note 26, at 487-509 (providing information For U.S. FTAs 
concluded after 2000). 
36
 See Yu, supra note 30, at 505, 505 n. 98 (explaining that the reasons why developed 
countries did not push for stronger IP enforcement until the mid-2000s are, first, 
because of TRIPS Art. 65 which makes transitional arrangements for developing 
countries, and second, due to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health adopted in 2001 which promotes better access to medicine) (emphasis 
added). 
37
 See generally the following tabled proposals: (i) Council for Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Communication from the European Communities, IP/C/W/448 (June 9, 2005) 
(detailing the measure that was tabled by the European Union (at the time as the 
European Communities) in June 2005; The European Union (at the time the European 
Communities) called for the examination of the compliance of members with the 
enforcement provisions of TRIPS, underlining the evolution of counterfeiting and 
piracy worldwide and asking the point to be placed on the agenda of the TRIPS 
Council; (ii) Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from the 
European Communities, IP/C/W/468 (Mar. 10, 2006); TRIPS Council, Enforcing 
Intellectual Property Rights: Border Measures: Communication from the European 
Communities, IP/C/W/471 (June 9, 2006) (detailing that the measure was tabled by the 
European Union in May and June 2006: Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights; The European Union has proposed the discussion on 
enforcement provisions with the particular focus on “border measures”; (iii) Council 
for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights: Joint Communication from the European Communities, Japan, 
Switzerland and the United States, IP/C/W/485 (Nov. 2, 2006) (detailing that the 
measure was tabled by the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States 
in November 2006 as a joint communication); (iv) Council for Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Part III of 
the TRIPS Agreement): Experiences of Border Enforcement: Communication from the 
United States, IP/C/W/488 (Jan. 30, 2007) (providing that the measure was tabled by 
the United States in January 2007); (v) Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Forthcoming in: Currents, International Trade Law Journal (2012), vol. 20(2), pp. 20-44. 
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These proposals however met opposition notably from Argentina, Brazil, 
Cuba, China, India, and South Africa. 38  The foreseeable difficulty in 
deliberating domestic enforcement at the TRIPS Council has therefore 
resulted in the statement by the European Union, Japan, and the United 
States and a few other developed states on October 23, 2007 to commence 
negotiations to create ACTA.39 
2. Signing and Ratifying ACTA 
As of October 5, 2012, among thirty-eight participants who negotiated the 
ACTA,40 thirty-two have signed it.41 The remaining six that have not yet 
signed it are: Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and 
Switzerland. The ratification of six signatories is required for the treaty to 
enter into force.42  In the (unlikely) event that those WTO members that did 
not participate in the ACTA negotiation still wish to sign the treaty, “the 
participants may agree to [those states’ signature] by consensus.”43 After the 
first two years (from May 1, 2011 to May 1, 2013), WTO members that 
                                                                                                                            
Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Communication and Cooperation as a Key to Effective Border Measures: 
Communication from Switzerland, IP/C/W/492 (May 31, 2007) (detailing that the 
measure was tabled by Switzerland in May 2007); (vi) Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Communication from Japan, IP/C/W/501 (Oct. 11, 2007) (providing that the measure 
was tabled by Japan in October 2007). 
38
 See Yu, supra note 30, at 507-08 (providing a response to the United States’ 
communication tabled in January 2007). 
39
 Id. at 511-12. 
40
 ACTA, supra note 3, at E-23, n.17  (detailing that ACTA was negotiated by 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
41
 Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) by Japan, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/acta_conclusion_1210.html (“Australia, 
Canada, the European Union (and its 22 Member States), Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States have already signed 
the ACTA.”). 
42
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 40(1). 
43
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 39 (providing that “this Agreement shall remain open for 
signature by participants in its negotiation, and by any other WTO Members the 
participants may agree to by consensus, from 1 May 2011 until 1 May 2013.”) (original 
footnote omitted). 
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wish to join the treaty need to “apply” to accede to ACTA,44 and the ACTA 
Committee decides the terms of accession for each applicant.45 
The prospect for ratification is by no means promising at the time of writing. 
The earliest county that completed the conclusion procedures was Japan. 
ACTA was approved by the Japanese House of Councillors on August 3, 
2012, and by the House of Representatives on 6 September. Yet in other 
signatory countries, legal and political issues have delayed or virtually 
halted the ratification process. In Australia, the treaty was tabled in 
Parliament in November 2011. In June 2012, Australia’s Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties recommended not to ratify ACTA until the 
independent assessment of the economic and social benefits and costs of the 
Agreement is conducted and until the Australian Law Reform Commission 
reports on its inquiry into copyright; the deadline of the Commission’s 
report is November 30, 2013.46 
Critical is the position of the EU, which has not yet ratified ACTA. It 
effectively determines the ratification by the EU member states and also 
influences the position of non-EU states.47 The EU Council adopted ACTA 
unanimously in December 2011. The EU Commission has passed the 
agreement on for ratification to the Member States and for a vote to the 
European Parliament. Under Articles 207 and 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU, ACTA 
needs the consent of the European Parliament. Since ACTA is a mixed 
agreement under EU law, it needs ratification not only by the EU, but also 
by the Member States. However, at present ACTA does not have the 
necessary votes to pass through the European Parliament, which voted the 
agreement down on July 4, 2012. The European Commission has further 
referred the issue of ACTA’s legality to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union.48 From the perspective of the Commission, sending ACTA to the 
Court of Justice has political and legal advantages, such as longevity and 
                                                 
44
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 43(1). 
45
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 43(2) (detailing that the ACTA Committee is established 
by Art. 36 of ACTA to review its implementation and operation.  Each party is 
represented on the Committee.). 
46
 JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON TREATIES, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, REVIEW 
INTO TREATY TABLED ON 21 NOVEMBER 2011: REPORT 126, 60 (June 27, 2012) 
[hereinafter Australian Parliament Report], available at 
http://aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Co
mmittees?url=jsct/21november2011/report.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2012). 
47
 Id. at ch. 8, ¶8.16 (observing that “[i]n considering its recommendation to ratify 
ACTA, a future Joint Standing Committee on Treaties should have regard to events 
related to ACTA in other relevant jurisdictions, including the EU and the US.”). 
48
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 218(11), Mar. 30, 2010, O.J. 
(C 83) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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clarity. Several Member States that signed the treaties have halted 
ratification procedures (e.g., Bulgaria,49 Latvia,50 Poland,51 Slovenia52). 
3. ACTA’s Broader Implications for the International Regulation of IP 
Rights 
In view of these political setbacks within the European Union, there appears 
“a very real possibility” that ACTA will not come into force, as the 
Australian Joint Standing Committee on Treaties observed in June 2012.53 
Despite the unpromising prospect for ACTA, it should be recalled that the 
aim of ACTA’s negotiating states should go beyond the reform of the 
enforcement procedures among themselves. Standards set out in ACTA are 
likely to be used in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations.54 Already, 
the U.S. government’s draft on IP rights, released in February 2011, for the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)55 has extensive provisions that are in part 
comparable to those of ACTA. 56  A number of the existing parties and 
negotiating states of TPP are signatories to ACTA (Australia, Canada, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, Unite States). Such “forum shifting” 
                                                 
49
 Bulgaria Postpones ACTA Ratification, EUOBSERVER.COM, (Feb. 15, 2012, 09:29 
AM), http://euobserver.com/tickers/115263. 
50
 Minister Blocks Ratification of ACTA, BALTIC NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://bnn-news.com/economy-minister-blocks-ratification-acta-49079. 
51
 Poland Suspends ACTA Ratification, WARSAW BUSINESS JOURNAL (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://wbj.pl/article-57880-poland-suspends-acta-ratification.html. 
52
 Government Puts ACTA in Freezer Pending EU-Wide Decision, REPUBLIC OF 
SLOVENIA (Mar. 15, 2012), http://evropa.gov.si/en/content/latest-
news/news/select/general/news/government-puts-acta-in-freezer-pending-eu-wide-
decision/c95da056c5/. 
53
 Australian Parliament Report, supra note 46, ¶ 8.10; ACTA Tritt "Wahrscheinlich 
Nicht in Kraft" [ACTA Probably Not Into Force] , SPIEGEL ONLINE (May 4, 2012), 
http://evropa.gov.si/en/content/latest-news/news/select/general/news/government-puts-
acta-in-freezer-pending-eu-wide-decision/c95da056c5/. 
54
 See Michael Geist, The Trouble with ACTA: An Analysis of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, WORKSHOP: THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT 26, 33 
(Mar. 29, 2012), available at http://europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studies.html. 
55
 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): 15th Round of TPP Negotiations Set for Auckland, 
New Zealand -- December 3-12, 2012, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, http://ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (detailing that TPP is 
a FTA concluded in 2005 among Brunei, Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand, and has 
been negotiated, as of July 1, 2012, among Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, 
United States, Peru, and Vietnam). 
56
 E.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, Draft, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L,(Feb. 10, 2011), http://keionline.org/tpp (detailing that 
the U.S. government draft of the intellectual property chapter of the TPP); see also S. 
K. Sell, TRIPS was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP , 1 
J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 462–68 (2011) (showing the shifting of IP protection forum 
from ACTA (and FTA) to TPP). 
Forthcoming in: Currents, International Trade Law Journal (2012), vol. 20(2), pp. 20-44. 
12 
from ACTA must be understood as part of the “TRIPS-plus” process. The 
origin of this process is not necessarily with ACTA, but with FTAs 
involving the U.S. and the EU, which include even higher standards than 
those eventually accommodated in ACTA.57 
ACTA negotiating states have also resumed their attempts to push forward 
the enhanced enforcement at the multilateral forum. In June 2012, the U.S. 
and Japan presented new papers at the TRIPS Council, which stressed the 
enforcement-related challenges against counterfeiting.58 The papers found 
support from the EU, Korea, Canada, Switzerland, and Mexico, while 
raising concern from some developing countries in that the U.S.-Japan 
papers might go beyond the existing requirements under Article 51 of 
TRIPS.59 
Overall, ACTA, albeit negotiated outside the multilateral forum, seems to be 
one of the stepping-stones to achieving a global-scale reform on IP 
enforcement. This characterization of ACTA explains why, at the TRIPS 
Council in June 2010, China and India, supported by a number of other 
developing countries, took active steps to voice their concern over 
“enforcement trends” beyond the standards set out in TRIPS.60 China and 
India argued that ACTA would conflict with TRIPS, including Article 1(1), 
undermine the balance of rights, obligations and flexibilities under WTO 
agreements, and disrupt goods in transit or transhipment.61 When ACTA 
participants informed the WTO membership about the treaty in October 
2011, 62  India, Angola, Ecuador, Brazil, China, Chile, Venezuela and 
                                                 
57
 See Mercurio, supra note 28, at 20–21, 26–30. 
58
 How and Where to Handle Counterfeit Trademarked Goods, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (June 5, 2012), 
http://wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/trip_05jun12_e.htm; Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Securing Supply Chains Against 
Counterfeit Goods: Communication from the United States, IP/C/W/570 (May 31, 
2012); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from Japan, IP/C/W/571 (May 31, 
2012). 
59
 How and Where to Handle Counterfeit Trademarked Goods, supra note 58; Supply 
Chains Against Counterfeit Goods: Communication from the United States, supra note 
58; Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from Japan, supra 
note 58. 
60
 Council Debates Anti-Counterfeiting Talks, Patents on Life, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (June 8-9, 2010), 
http://wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/trip_08jun10_e.htm; Geist, supra note 54, at 
33-34. 
61
 Council Debates Anti-Counterfeiting Talks, supra note 60; Geist, supra note 54, at 
33-34. 
62
 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from Australia, Canada, the European 
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Zimbabwe repeated concerns, raised in previous meetings in 2010, 
including ACTA’s effect on access to medicines.63 
 
B. On Substance:  Altering the Balance in Favor of the Right 
Holders 
ACTA consists of six chapters. The main provisions are laid down in 
Chapter II entitled “Legal Framework for Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights”, which is composed of five sections: general obligations 
(Section 1 of Chapter II, ACTA), civil enforcement (Section 2), border 
measures (Section 3), criminal enforcement (Section 4), and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in the digital environment (Section 5). Section 5 
has sparked wide public controversy. While Section 5 contains a number of 
important provisions, 64  crucial is Article 27(1), 65  which mandates the 
application of Section 2 (civil enforcement) and Section 4 (criminal 
enforcement) to the acts carried out on the Internet.66 
ACTA differs from TRIPS in a number of aspects. In short, the 2011 treaty 
shifts the balance between the protection of the IP right holders on one hand, 
and the protection of importers and users of goods and services, on the 
other.67 How we should balance these often competing interests is one of the 
                                                                                                                            
Union, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States, 
IP/C/W/563 (Oct. 17, 2011). 
63
 Intellectual Property Council Talks Health, Tobacco Packaging and Enforcement, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION NEWS (Oct. 24-25, 2011), 
http://wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/trip_24oct11_e.htm (detailing that ACTA was 
discussed again at the TRIPS Council in February 2012, in which negotiating states 
have stressed that ACTA does not target generic medicines or legitimate access to the 
internet, which likewise met criticisms from India, China, and Brazil and some other 
non-negotiating states); Intellectual Property Council Discusses Anti-Counterfeiting 
Pact, Tobacco Packaging, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION NEWS (Feb. 28-29, 2012), 
http://wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/trip_28feb12_e.htm. 
64
 Compare ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 27(5) (requiring parties to provide adequate 
legal protection and effective legal remedies against the “circumvention of effective 
technological measures,” with Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 
112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (showing that the anti-circumvention provision of ACTA is 
similar to the U.S.’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act). 
65
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 27(1) (requiring that “[e]ach Party shall ensure that 
enforcement procedures, to the extent set forth in Sections 2 (Civil Enforcement) and 4 
(Criminal Enforcement), are available under its law so as to permit effective action 
against an act of infringement of intellectual property rights which takes place in the 
digital environment . . . ”) (emphasis added). 
66
 YAMANE, supra note 26, at 151, 158 (indicating TRIPS does not contain specific 
rules on internet-related copyright protection). 
67
 See Kaminski, supra note 7, at 13. 
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fundamental points of contention underlying IP rights enforcement, which 
also summarizes the division of opinions between industrialized states and 
developing states we have described above. Among a number of differences 
between TRIPS and ACTA,68  the key points are highlighted here. They 
illustrate how ACTA seeks to change the aforementioned delicate, and often 
country-specific balance in favor of the IP-right holders. 
1. Scope of IP Rights 
On the most fundamental level, ACTA subjects a broader range of IP-
related rights to enforcement provisions. It employs the term intellectual 
property throughout Chapter II. Under Article 5(h) of ACTA, intellectual 
property is defined as “all categories of intellectual property that are the 
subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement”,69 
including not only copyright and related rights and trademarks, but also: 
geographical indications; industrial designs; patents; and the layout-designs 
(topographies) of integrated circuits; and, the protection of undisclosed 
information.70  The general term intellectual property is likewise employed 
in Part III of TRIPS (enforcement). Yet its less stringent enforcement 
provisions compensate the use of the general term. 
Patents and protection of undisclosed information “may” be excluded from 
Section 2 (civil enforcement)71 if parties wish to do so.72 Nevertheless, to 
phrase the scope in such a way as to allow exclusion suggests that the 
exclusion is the exception rather than the rule; this may encourage parties to 
apply civil enforcement provisions to patent and undisclosed information.73 
Patent violations are extremely technical and thus hard to detect. If 
authorities that have no expertise in patents apply the enforcement measures 
or apply them against third parties who may have no ability to detect patent 
law violations, this could significantly deter business dealings, including 
those of generic drug markers.74 
                                                 
68
 Sean M. Flynn & Bijan Madhani, ACTA and Access to Medicines, American 
University, WCL RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2012-03, (2012) (discussing the section-by-
section comparison and analysis have been conducted by a number of studies); See, 
e.g., Weatherall, supra note 7. 
69
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 5, ¶ (h). 
70
 TRIPS, supra note 12, Part II, §§ 1-7 (titles only).  
71
 See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing civil enforcement). 
72
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 2, n.2. 
73
 Flynn & Madhani, supra note 68, at 13. 
74
 Id. at 12. 
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With regard to Section 3 (border measures),75 ACTA did not specifically 
restrict the application of border measures to counterfeit trademark and 
pirated copyright goods as provided in the first sentence of Article 51 of 
TRIPS.76 From the footnote to Article 13 of ACTA,77 it is clear that patents 
and the protection of undisclosed information are not the mandatory 
coverage of Section 3. Although, at the same time, parties are not prohibited 
from having border procedures for patents either.78 What remains unclear is 
the extent to which Section 3 applies to other IP rights.  
Two contrasting constructions seem possible. First, it could be argued that 
no particular IP rights are required to be protected by Section 3.79  This 
reading finds support in the fact that neither Article 13 nor Article 16 
explicitly provide for the scope of IP covered by Section 3. While Article 13 
mentions “intellectual property rights”, it is difficult to read this provision as 
obliging parties to apply border measures for IP rights in general since it 
requires parties to provide enforcement “as appropriate” and is conditioned 
on domestic system and TRIPS’ requirements. While this first reading 
carries conviction especially from the literal reading of Articles 13 and 16, a 
difficulty is that it would effectively deprive the legal significance of 
Section 3. If there was no requirement to protect IP rights in the first place, 
                                                 
75
 See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing border measures). 
76
 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 51 (providing that “[m]embers shall . . . adopt 
procedures to enable a right holder, who has valid grounds for suspecting that the 
importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods may take place, to 
lodge an application in writing with competent authorities, administrative or judicial, 
for the suspension by the customs authorities of the release into free circulation of such 
goods. Members may enable such an application to be made in respect of goods which 
involve other infringements of intellectual property rights . . . Members may also 
provide for corresponding procedures concerning the suspension by the customs 
authorities of the release of infringing goods destined for exportation from their 
territories.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); Weatherall, supra note 7, at 248 
(indicating it would have been easier to identify the scope of Section 3 if ACTA simply 
restricts its border measures to these two items). 
77
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 13 (discussing border measures: “[i]n providing, as 
appropriate, and consistent with its domestic system of intellectual property rights 
protection and without prejudice to the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, for 
effective border enforcement of intellectual property rights, a Party should do so in a 
manner that does not discriminate unjustifiably between intellectual property rights and 
that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.”) (emphasis added); art. 13, n.6 
(providing that “[t]he Parties agree that patents and protection of undisclosed 
information do not fall within the scope of this Section.”) (emphasis added). 
78
 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to International 
Trade? ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 645, 
667–68 (2011); See TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 51 (indicating in the second sentence 
of art. 51 of TRIPS envisages border measures for wider IP rights); See Weatherall, 
supra note 7, at 246. 
79
 See Weatherall, supra note 7, at 247–48. 
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it would be absurd to distinguish the term “shall” from “may”. An 
alternative second reading thus appears to be more persuasive. It can be 
reasonably argued that parties are in principle required to apply Section 3 to 
all IP rights except for those excluded.80 This means that Section 3 applies 
to IP rights other than patent and undisclosed information. 81  This wide 
reading finds support from the facts that Article 13 and a few other 
provisions in Section 3 employ the general term “intellectual property”, and 
that parties have taken a positive step to exclude certain IP rights. Also, 
during the drafting process, the Public Pre-decisional/Deliberative Draft in 
April 2010 envisaged the application of border measures to goods infringing 
“intellectual property rights” in general. 82  The following exclusion of 
patents seems to uphold the interpretation that other IP rights remain 
unaffected. 
If we follow this second interpretation, a key question concerns the 
interpretation of the effect of Article 13. Article 13 is a product of the final 
phase of the negotiation to bridge the differences between the EU (which 
claimed the application of border measures to widen IP rights, including 
geographical indications) and the U.S. and Australia (which opposed the 
extension).83 The provision seems to allow ACTA parties to exclude certain 
IP infringements from the scope of domestic border enforcement systems.84 
However, the extent to which the parties are allowed to do so is far from 
clear. These uncertainties are caused by the use of the term “should” as 
opposed to “shall.”  Also, Article 13 employs such terms as “as appropriate” 
and “unjustifiably,” which readily allows diverging interpretations.85 
2. Civil Enforcement: Third-Party Injunction over Export, Eased 
Damage Calculation, and Information Disclosure by Alleged 
Infringers 
With respect to Section 2 (civil enforcement), ACTA has strengthened the 
protection of right holders broadly in the following three facets: first, it 
introduced injunction over experts against third parties; second, it detailed 
                                                 
80
 See Ruse-Khan, supra note 78, at 673–74. 
81
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 13, n.6 (section 3 applies to copyright, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs, and the layout-designs of integrated 
circuits). 
82
 Public Release ACTA, supra note 21, at arts. 2.X(1), (2) (discussing the scope of 
border measures). 
83
 Ruse-Khan, supra note 78, at 678; Weatherall, supra note 7, at 245. 
84
 Ruse-Khan, supra note 78, at 677–81. 
85
 Ruse-Kahn, supra note 78, at 680-81. 
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the calculation of damages; and finally, it extended the scope of information 
to be disclosed in civil proceedings.  
Under the first sentence of Article 44(1) of TRIPS,86 “judicial authorities 
shall have the authority to issue an injunction to prevent the entry of 
imported goods” and “[i]njunctions under Article 8 of ACTA differs from 
TRIPS on at least two points.”87 First, the injunction under Article 44(1) of 
TRIPS concerns the “imported goods” entering into the channels of 
commerce “in their jurisdiction.”88 Article 8 of ACTA lacks these terms, 
thereby enables injunctions to be issued not only with imports, but also with 
exports. This means courts can issue injunctions preventing goods from 
entering into the channels of commerce of non-parties, which the goods in 
question may not contravene IP law. Second, under Article 8(1) of ACTA, 
an injunction can be issued not only against a party, but also against a “third 
party” over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction.89 
Such a “third party” provision is likewise found in Article 12(1)(a) of 
ACTA regarding provisional measures.90 Article 12(1)(a) obligates parties 
to provide their judicial authorities with the power to order provisional 
measures against a party or, “where appropriate, a third party.”91 While the 
term “intermediaries” is much criticized,92 the replacement does not seem to 
restrict the scope of actors resisting injunction or provisional relief.  Third-
                                                 
86
 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 44(1) (providing that, “1. The judicial authorities shall 
have the authority to order a party to desist from an infringement . . . to prevent the 
entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that 
involve the infringement of an intellectual property right, immediately after customs 
clearance of such goods…”) (emphasis added). 
87
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 8 (providing that “[e]ach Party shall provide that, in civil 
judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its 
judicial authorities have the authority to issue an order against a party to desist from an 
infringement, and . . . an order to that party or, where appropriate, to a third party over 
whom the relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to prevent goods that 
involve the infringement of an intellectual property right from entering into the 
channels of commerce.”) (emphasis added). 
88
 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 44.1. 
89
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 8.1. 
90
 ACTA, supra note 3, at 12(1)(a). 
91
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 12(1) (listing provisional measures as: “1. Each Party 
shall provide that its judicial authorities have the authority to order prompt and 
effective provisional measures: (a) against a party or, where appropriate, a third party 
over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction …” ) (emphasis 
added); cf. TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 50 (finding the TRIPS Agreement does not 
provide measures against a third party and provisional measures are to prevent the 
entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction). 
92
 See Brook K. Baker, ACTA - Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to 
Medicines, 26 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 579, 583–586 
(2011). 
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party enforcement provisions may allow injunctive and provisional 
measures against a wide range of individuals in the generic medicine trade.93 
In addition to third-party injunctive and provisional measures, ACTA gives 
right holders favorable damages in civil proceeding.  Under Article 45(1) of 
TRIPS, damages are formulated as those “adequate to compensate for the 
injury the right holder has suffered.”94 Article 9 of ACTA is an attempt to 
reduce the flexibility and uncertainty of the damages formula in TRIPS.95 
While the first sentence under ACTA Article 9(1) reiterates the general 
formula in TRIPS, 96  the second sentence of Article 9(1) is noteworthy. 
Under Article ACTA Article 9(1) a party is obligated to provide their 
judicial authorities with the power to consider lost profits, the market price, 
or the suggested retail price to determine the amount of damages. 97  In 
copyright lawsuits on unauthorized downloads, “lost profits” damages are 
highly controversial. According to ACTA Article 9(2), such an amount of 
damages may also be presumed as “profits” that the infringer is required to 
pay to the right holder.98 The measures of value suggested by ACTA, such 
as “market price” or “suggested retail price”, would likely raise the amount 
of damages. In patent litigation, the possibility of facing significantly high 
                                                 
93
 See generally id. (detailing that “[i]t was used in the earlier draft text of the treaty 
without any explicit jurisdictional limits and was eventually replaced with “third 
party”). 
94
 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 45 (enumerating damages as: “1. The judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder 
damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered because of 
an infringement of that person’s intellectual property right by an infringer who 
knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity”) 
(emphasis added). 
95
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 9 (enumerating damages as: “1. …  In determining the 
amount of damages for infringement of intellectual property rights, a Party’s judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to consider . . . any legitimate measure of value the 
right holder submits, which may include lost profits, the value of the infringed goods or 
services measured by the market price, or the suggested retail price. 2. At least in cases 
of copyright or related rights infringement and trademark counterfeiting . . . [a] Party 
may presume [the infringer’s] profits to be the amount of damages referred to in 
paragraph 1.  3. At least with respect to infringement of copyright or related rights 
protecting works, phonograms, and performances, and in cases of trademark 
counterfeiting, each Party shall also establish or maintain a system that provides for 
one or more of the following: (a) pre-established damages; or (b) presumptions for 
determining the amount of damages . . . ; or (c) at least for copyright, additional 
damages. 4. [A] Party . . . ensure that either its judicial authorities or the right holder 
has the right to choose such a remedy [referred to in subparagraph 3(a)] or 
presumptions [referred to in subparagraph 3(b)] as an alternative to the remedies 
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.”) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
96
 See ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 9(1); see also TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 45(1). 
97
 See ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 9(1). 
98
 Id. at art. 9(2). 
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damages would discourage patent holders to offer discounts to medicines 
and would eventually deter developing countries from accessing 
medicines.99 With respect to copyright and trademark, ACTA Article 9(3) 
provides three alternative forms of damages for copyrights and trademark 
counterfeiting. While these alternative methods do not appear in TRIPS, it 
seems unlikely that these alternatives would bring a major change to the 
protection systems currently used by ACTA signatories. Change is unlikely 
because there are different systems of calculating damages in the U.S., the 
EU, Australia, and some other negotiating states.100 In addition, once a party 
establishes statutory damages, ACTA Article 9(4) should allow either 
judicial authorities or the right holder to choose statutory damages instead 
of actual damages.101 This choice would significantly help right holders in 
the absence of provable actual damages.102 
Both the third-party injunction in ACTA Article 8 and the facilitation of 
damage calculation in ACTA Article 9 must be understood in conjunction 
with judicial authorities’ ability to order disclosure of information in civil 
proceedings at a request of the right holder. As contrasted with TRIPS 
Article 47,103  ACTA Article 11 mandates parties to give their judiciary 
discretion to issue an order to disclose information. Under ACTA Article 11, 
a disclosure order can be issued not only against the infringer, but also 
against alleged infringer, which may require the infringer or alleged 
infringer to provide the right holder the information on the channels of 
distribution of alleged infringing goods.104 Article 11 also omits the phrase 
                                                 
99
 See Flynn & Madhani, supra note 68, at 9–10, 15–17. 
100
 See Weatherall, supra note 7, at 251. 
101
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 9(4). 
102
 See Kaminski, supra note 7, at 13. 
103
 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 47 (detailing the right to information as: “[m]embers 
may provide that the judicial authorities shall have the authority, unless this would be 
out of proportion to the seriousness of the infringement, to order the infringer to inform 
the right holder of the identity of third persons involved in the production and 
distribution of the infringing goods or services and of their channels of distribution.”) 
(emphasis added). 
104
 ACTA, supra note 3, art. 11(detailing information related to infringement as: 
“[w]ithout prejudice to its law governing privilege, the protection of confidentiality of 
information sources, or the processing of personal data, each Party shall provide 
that . . . its judicial authorities have the authority, upon a justified request of the right 
holder, to order the infringer or, in the alternative, the alleged infringer, to provide to 
the right holder or to the judicial authorities . . . relevant information . . . . Such 
information may include information regarding any person involved in any aspect of 
the infringement or alleged infringement and regarding the means of production or the 
channels of distribution of the infringing or allegedly infringing goods or services, 
including the identification of third persons alleged to be involved in the production 
and distribution of such goods or services and of their channels of distribution.”) 
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used in Trips Article 47, “unless this would be out of proportion to the 
seriousness of the infringement.” 105  This omission in ACTA Article 11 
balances the interest of the right holder and the possible adversarial effects 
of information disclosure. Overall, ACTA Article 11 seems to give a great 
advantage to right holders, not only in submitting the measures for 
determining damages in a present proceeding, but also in instituting new 
legal actions against third parties whose involvement is disclosed by the 
infringer or alleged infringer; and in devising non-judicial means to prevent 
the infringement of their rights. 106  
3. Border Measures: Over Export and “In-Transit” Shipments 
To strengthen border measures (Section 3) was a priority for developed 
countries, which had unsuccessfully brought the issue before the TRIPS 
Council.107 As contrasted with the third sentence of TRIPS Article 51,108 
ACTA Article 16(1) employed a mandatory language not only for import, 
but also export shipments.109  This also means that other pertinent treaty 
regulations on border measures (such as the determination of an 
infringement under Article 19, and available remedies under Article 20) 
would be applied to the border procedures for goods destined for 
exportation.110 Under TRIPS, if a WTO member extends border measures to 
exports under the third sentence of Article 51, it was not obliged to adhere 
to other pertinent regulations, such as those concerning the destruction of 
                                                                                                                            
(emphasis added); see generally A. J. C. Silva, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights 
by Diminishing Privacy: How the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Jeopardizes 
the Right to Privacy, 26 AMER. U. INT'L L. REV. 601 (2011) (providing further 
information on ACTA and privacy). 
105
 Compare ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 11, with TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 47. 
106
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 22(c) (mandating parties to authorize its competent 
authorities to provide a right holder with information about suspect goods); cf. TRIPS, 
supra note 8, at art. 57, third sentence; see also Section I-B-3 (discussing the disclosure 
of information in favor of the right holder). 
107
 See generally Tabled Measures, supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
108
 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 51, third sentence. 
109
 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 16. (defining border protections as: “1. Each Party shall 
adopt or maintain procedures with respect to import and export shipments under which: 
(a) its customs authorities may act upon their own initiative to suspend the release of 
suspect goods; and (b) where appropriate, a right holder may request its competent 
authorities to suspend the release of suspect goods. 2. A Party may adopt or maintain 
procedures with respect to suspect in-transit goods or in other situations where the 
goods are under customs control under which: (a) its customs authorities may act upon 
their own initiative to suspend the release of, or to detain, suspect goods; and (b) where 
appropriate, a right holder may request its competent authorities to suspend the release 
of, or to detain, suspect goods.”) (emphasis added). 
110
 See ACTA, supra note 3, at arts. 19-20. 
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infringing goods under Article 59.111 Thus these TRIPS provisions had little 
value in regulating states from which infringing goods were exported.112  
Article 16(2) of ACTA also specifically permits the suspension of release 
regarding in-transit goods.113 These “in-transit” goods include goods under 
“transhipment,” which are going through a customs office that intermediates 
between import and export.114 A crucial point with regard to the in-transit 
measure is under which domestic law the infringing status of goods is 
determined.115 While Article 16 does not provide any clear-cut guidance, 
other treaty provisions suggest that the infringement would be based on the 
law of the country in which border procedures are invoked.116 This reading 
finds support from the definition of “counterfeit trademark goods” and 
“pirated copyright goods” provided in Article 5 of ACTA—although these 
terms by themselves do not appear in Article 16. 117  Under Article 5, 
infringement for the purpose of defining “counterfeit trademark goods” and 
“pirated copyright goods” is assessed under the law of the country in which 
the procedures are invoked.118 This definition is contrasted with TRIPS, 
under which “counterfeit trademark goods” bear a non-authorized trademark, 
which infringes the owner’s rights under the law of the country of 
importation, 119  and pirated copyright goods are also restricted to the 
                                                 
111
 See Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, ¶ 7.224 (Jan. 22, 2009); Henning Grosse 
Ruse-Khan, China—Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for the TRIPS-Plus 
Border Measures, 13 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 620, 623-24 & 634 n.9 (2010). 
112
 See Ruse-Khan, supra note 111, at 624-26. 
113
 See ACTA, supra note 3, at art.16(2). 
114
 See ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 5(i) & (n). 
115
 See Weatherall, supra note 7, at 249-51. 
116
 See id. at 250 (discussing that “[e]ach Part shall provide that its competent 
authorities require a right holder… to provide adequate evidence… that, under the law 
of the Party providing the procedures, there is…an infringement of the right holder’s 
intellectual property right…”) (emphasis added).  
117
 Id. 
118
 See ACTA, supra  note 3, at art. 5(d), (k) (defining: (d) “counterfeit trademark goods” 
means any goods…bearing without authorization a trademark…and which thereby 
infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the 
country in which the procedures set forth in Chapter II (Legal Framework for 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights) are invoked… ; (k) “pirated copyright 
goods” means any goods which are copies made without the consent of the right 
holder…and which are made directly or indirectly from an article where the making of 
that copy would have constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right 
under the law of the country in which the procedures set forth in Chapter II (Legal 
Framework for Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights) are invoked) (emphasis 
added). 
119
 See TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 51 n.14 (defining: (a) “counterfeit trademark 
goods” shall mean any goods…bearing without authorization a trademark…and which 
Forthcoming in: Currents, International Trade Law Journal (2012), vol. 20(2), pp. 20-44. 
22 
infringement under the law of the country of importation.120 The definition 
adopted by Article 5 of ACTA enables a party from which goods would be 
exported, and, more importantly, a party through which the goods simply 
transit, to regard those goods as counterfeited or pirated, and to take border 
measures against those goods. This gives rise to the concern that goods, 
such as generic medicines, exported from a non-party to another non-party 
may be seized at the custom of an ACTA member state through which the 
goods transit.121 
It can be observed that Article 16(2) of ACTA is the same as TRIPS in that 
it does not oblige parties to introduce border measures against in-transit 
goods. 122  Nevertheless, the explicit authorization under ACTA serves as 
justification for parties, given that the suspension of in-transit goods is both 
politically and legally controversial as it hinders the shipment of medicines 
to developing countries. The political and legal controversy has been 
triggered by the well-known “Dutch seizures” case, albeit concerning 
patents that are not covered by ACTA’s border measure requirements.123 In 
2008, Dutch authorities decided to seize, delay, and return several shipments 
of generic drugs originated in India and transiting EU ports en route to 
destinations in South America, including Brazil, and Africa, on the basis of 
suspected patent infringements.124 In May 2010, India and Brazil initiated 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the EU and the Netherlands,125 
in which India and Brazil have invoked the inconsistency with several 
TRIPS provisions of the in-transit seizure.126 
                                                                                                                            
thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of 
the country of importation; (b) “pirated copyright goods” shall mean any goods which 
are copies made without the consent of the right holder…and which are made directly 
or indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have constituted an 
infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of the country of 
importation.) (emphasis added). 
120
 Id. 
121
 See Kaminski, supra note 7, at 9. 
122
 See TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 51 n.13 (“It is understood that there shall be no 
obligation to apply procedure … to goods in transit”) (emphasis added). 
123
 See Flynn, supra note 68, at 7 & n.18 (discussing access to medicines may still be 
jeopardized because medicines are also subject to trademark rules). 
124
 See Ruse-Khan, supra note 78, at 648-51. 
125
 Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member State—Seizure 
of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010); Request for Consultations 
by India, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, 
WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010). 
126
 See generally Ruse-Khan, supra note 78 (discussing analysis regarding border 
measures). 
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ACTA’s robust protection of IP rights will be sustained by ex officio actions 
initiated by members’ authorities. As highlighted by the findings of the 
WTO Panel in China-IP Rights,127 TRIPS obligations in respect of domestic 
enforcement are primarily to provide authority to take certain measures “at 
the request of right holders,” and not to require the government to take 
“active” measures to ensure the respect for intellectual property,128 giving 
rise to the question whether TRIPS works as a forceful tool to achieve 
intellectual property enforcement.129  
Under ACTA, ex officio actions are provided both with respect to border 
measures and criminal enforcement. Article 16(1)(a) of ACTA mandates a 
party to adopt procedures according to which its customs authorities may act 
upon their own initiative to suspend the release of suspect goods, and not 
only upon the request of a right holder.130 A crucial concern may be the 
specific conditions on which customs authorities act on their own initiative. 
Under Article 58 of TRIPS, the ex officio suspension of goods was to be 
taken with “prima facie evidence that an intellectual property right is being 
infringed,” followed by prompt notification to the importer and the right 
holder, under the limited duration of suspension.131 These safeguards do not 
appear in Article 16 of ACTA, which merely provides for the suspension of 
“suspect” goods. This gives rise to a great concern over the abusive use of 
the power to suspend the release of goods. ACTA has several general 
safeguards; for instance, the second sentence of Article 6(1) provides that 
enforcement procedures “shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the 
creation of barriers to legitimate trade.” 132  Yet the restrictive effect of 
Article 6(1) against in-transit seizure would be diminished if one simply 
excludes goods infringing any IP rights would not be regarded as 
“legitimate” trade.133 
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 Panel Report, supra note 111, at ¶7.224. 
128
 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog That Barked But Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual 
Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 389, 412-15 (2010). 
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 Id. at 415. 
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 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 16(1)(a); contra TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 51, first 
sentence & art. 58 (Ex Officio Action). 
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 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 54, 55, and 58. 
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 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 6(1); See Ruse-Khan, supra note 78, at 695–703. 
133
 Mercurio, supra note 28, at 377. 
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4. Criminal Enforcement: Criminal Offences Performed on the Internet, 
and Ex Officio Criminal Enforcement 
Under Article 61 of TRIPS, the only provision for criminal procedures, 
parties are obliged to criminalize certain IP rights infringements.134 As the 
WTO Panel noted in China-IP Rights (2009), however, Article 61 is “brief” 
with significant “limitations and flexibilities.” Its briefness and flexibility 
reflects “the sensitive nature of criminal matters and attendant concerns 
regarding sovereignty.”135 In fact, whether IP rights infringements ought to 
be criminalized at all could be theoretically contested.136 IP infringements 
do not normally involve violence, and people may not consider them as 
criminally punishable acts. It is also often conducted in association with 
socially productive activities, which may be unnecessarily discouraged by 
the deterrent effect. While the criminalization of IP rights infringements is 
not an uncommon practice, and it is an obligation under TRIPS with respect 
to trademark and copyright, each state still has different answers as to the 
extent to which IP rights infringements amount to criminal offences. 
Country-specific differences have resulted in the flexible formula under 
TRIPS. 
Reflecting developed states’ dissatisfactions with TRIP’s criminal offence 
provision, ACTA provides more extensive criminal enforcement provisions 
(Section 4). While the first sentence of Article 23(1) of ACTA virtually 
reiterates the first sentence of Article 61 of TRIPS,137 the second sentence of 
                                                 
134TRIPS, supra  note 12, at 345 (stating that, “[m]embers shall provide for criminal 
procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.  Remedies available shall 
include imprisonment and/or monetary fines.... In appropriate cases, remedies 
available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing 
goods and of any materials and implements the predominant use of which has been in 
the commission of the offence”) (emphasis added). 
135
 See Panel Report, supra note 111, ¶ 7.501; see YAMANE, supra note 26, at 248-57. 
136
 See Miriam Bitton, Rethinking the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’s Criminal 
Copyright Enforcement Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67, 72-94 (2012). 
137
 ACTA, supra note 3, at E-12 - E-13. (stating that, “1. Each Party shall provide for 
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale. For the 
purposes of this Section, acts carried out on a commercial scale include at least those 
carried out as commercial activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage.  2. Each Party shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be 
applied in cases of willful importation and domestic use, in the course of trade and on a 
commercial scale, of labels or packaging:  4. With respect to the offences specified in 
this Article for which a Party provides criminal procedures and penalties, that Party 
shall ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available under its law. 5. 
Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal 
principles, to establish the liability, which may be criminal, of legal persons for the 
offences specified in this Article...”) (emphasis added, and original footnotes omitted); 
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Article 23(1) of ACTA seeks to specify the term “commercial scale,” which 
was left undefined by Article 61 of TRIPS, so as to include the acts carried 
out as commercial activities for direct “or indirect” economic or commercial 
“advantage.” 138  The use of the expansive term “indirect…advantage” at 
least suggests that infringing acts could amount to a “commercial scale” 
insofar as they are commercial activities and even if those activities do not 
directly create commercial gain. 
The significance of this provision must be understood first in conjunction 
with the aforementioned Article 27(1), which extended criminal 
enforcement to the digital environment.139 Given that the Internet is now 
part of the daily lives of individuals, the definition of “commercial scale” as 
a dividing line bears a crucial importance in determining the relevance of 
ACTA to them. In Japan, one of the key signatories of ACTA, a user 
infringes copyright under the Copyright Act by downloading, with 
knowledge, music or videos protected by copyright even for “private 
use,” 140  which could also be a criminal offence. While the government 
assured the inapplicability of criminal enforcement provisions to private 
downloading,141 the vagueness of ACTA texts does not leave out the anxiety 
over the exact scope of “commercial scale” and its expansive interpretation 
in practice. If the acts which are considered as “private use” under the 
Copyright Act fall within the definition of “commercial scale” under ACTA, 
the scope of copyright infringements and criminal offence carried out on the 
internet may need to be amended for instance to cover copyright for 
photographs. 
Article 23(2) of ACTA expands the scope of a trademark offence.142 This 
provision is first to criminalize the use of “labels or packaging” even if they 
have not yet been attached to goods. For instance, the non-authorized use of 
such labels as “Prada” or “Gucci” could be criminal even if such labels have 
yet to be actually attached to bags or clothes for sale. Second, this provision 
                                                                                                                            
compare TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 61 (definition of “copyright piracy”), with ACTA, 
supra note 3, art. 23(1)) (definition of “copyright or related rights piracy”). 
138
 See ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 23(1). 
139
 See ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 27. 
140
 See Copyright Act No. 48 (May 6, 1970), amended by Act No. 73 (2009) (Japan) 
(describing that under the Copyright Act of Japan, it is permissible for a user to 
reproduce a copyright work for the purpose of “private use.” The 2009 amendment 
added another exception to this permissibility as part of measures to counter online 
piracy with respect to “digital sound or visual recording”). 
141
 During the Parliamentary debate: Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, 
Japanese House of Councillors, July 31, 2012 (a response by the Director-General of 
the Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  
142
 See ACTA, supra  note 3, at art. 23(2). 
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is to criminalize the acts of “willful importation and domestic use”, as 
opposed to the act of counterfeiting itself.143 This suggests that one could 
commit a criminal offence for the importation and use of a counterfeited 
trademark, even if that person did not create it. 
Article 23(4) further obligates the provision of criminal liability for “aiding 
and abetting” with respect to the trademark and copyright offences.144 Under 
ACTA, parties are obligated to introduce criminal procedures and penalties, 
not only for trademark and copyright offences carried out on the internet, 
but also for related criminal liability for aiding and abetting, which is 
carried out on the internet.145 Article 23(4) must be further read together 
with Article 23(5), which requires parties to establish the liability of “legal 
persons.” The combination of Articles 23(4), 27(1), and 23(5) seems to give 
rise to the possibility for criminal prosecution against internet service 
providers and social networks, such as Google and Facebook, for aiding and 
abetting an act of willful copyright piracy by their members.146 
In relation to criminal offences, Article 25 of ACTA broadened the scope of 
goods subject to seizure, forfeiture, and destruction. While Article 61 of 
TRIPS envisages the seizure of infringing goods, Article 25(1) of ACTA 
provides the seizure of suspected goods.147 Other materials subject to the 
seizure are also extended to include any related materials and implements 
used in the commission of the “alleged” offence, and also the “assets” 
obtained “indirectly” through the “alleged” infringing activity. 148  The 
procedures for forfeiture or destruction are extended by Article 25(4) of 
ACTA to apply them to the “assets” derived from, or obtained directly or 
“indirectly” through, the infringing activity, at least for serious offences.149 
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 Flynn & Madhani, supra note 68, at 11. 
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 See ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 23(2). 
145
 Id. at art. 23(4)&(5). 
146
 See Kaminski, supra note 7, at 19. 
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 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 25(1) (stating that, “[w]ith respect to the offences 
specified in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article 23 (Criminal Offences)…[a] Party shall 
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 Id. 
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 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 25(4) (providing: “With respect to the offences 
specified in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article 23 (Criminal Offences)…[a] Party shall 
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The article also obliges parties not to provide “compensation of any sort to 
the infringer” regarding the forfeiture or destruction.150 
Ex officio actions are introduced not only for border measures but also with 
regard to criminal enforcement. Article 26 of ACTA obligates a party to 
provide, in appropriate cases, its authorities to act upon their own initiative 
to initiate investigation or legal action for trademark and copyright 
offences.151 By Article 27(1), this also applies to the offences carried out on 
the Internet.152 The obligation to have ex officio criminal enforcement would 
have a notable impact on a party, in which an IP-related criminal offence is 
an Antragsdelikt (motion offense), which requires a formal complaint from a 
private party or right holder. This is the case of Japan, for instance, in which, 
under the Copyright Act, prosecution for certain criminal offences takes 
place only upon the filling of a complaint (by the injured person).153 ACTA 
may require the change to its copyright at least with respect to copyright 
infringements conducted for profit. In addition, depending on the 
construction of “commercial scale” (Article 23(1)) discussed above, 154 
ACTA may even require parties to not apply the concept of Antragsdelikt to 
music and video downloading for private use.155 The Japanese government 
reemphasized in July 2012 that ACTA was not to alter the motion offence 
provisions under the Copyright Act.156  Yet the government’s explanation 
was based upon the construction of the highly contextual terms “in 
appropriate cases” in Article 26 of ACTA. At present, the Japanese 
government does not regard it as “appropriate” to have ex officio criminal 
enforcement, despite the term “shall” used in Article 26. 
As was mentioned above, ACTA was drafted as a form of critique to TRIPS 
enforcement provisions. The background leading to the 2011 treaty and its 
                                                                                                                            
infringing activity. Each Party shall ensure that the forfeiture or destruction of such 
materials, implements, or assets shall occur without compensation of any sort to the 
infringer”). (emphasis added). 
150
 See id.; see also ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 25(3). 
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 ACTA, supra note 3, art. 26 (detailing that “[e]ach Party shall provide that, in 
appropriate cases, its competent authorities may act upon their own initiative to initiate 
investigation or legal action with respect to the criminal offences specified in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article 23 (Criminal Offences) for which that Party 
provides criminal procedures and penalties”) (emphasis added); see supra  notes 111-
114 and accompanying texts (describing ex officio actions regarding border measures). 
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 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 27. 
153
 See Copyright Act No. 43, supra note 140, at art. 123. 
154
 See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text. 
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 See Copyright Act, supra note 140, at art. 119(3). 
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 Jap. Parl. Deb., Japanese House of Councillors, Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defense (July 31, 2012) (a response by the Minister for Foreign Affairs).  
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terms suggest that ACTA seeks to reduce TRIP’s flexibility in domestic 
enforcement procedures by mandating and authorizing civil, border and 
criminal procedures. However, the broad coverage of IP rights under ACTA, 
and a number of changes which it brings to domestic IP laws and 
regulations, may necessarily require ACTA parties to interpret its provisions 
flexibly, including Article 13, which should preserve the flexibility that 
ACTA has sought to change. Perspectives from EU law are set out here in 
the next section.  
 
II. ACTA AND EU LAW 
From the perspective of EU law, several issues are considered concerning 
ACTA. First, the substance of ACTA, which we have analyzed in Section I-
B of this paper, goes beyond existing EU law in rights relevant areas. 
Second and more important, the negotiations of ACTA, an agreement with 
quasi-legislative character, were conducted in great secrecy and largely 
under exclusion of democratic input, which gives rise to concern whether 
under EU law the secrecy practiced unjustifiably undermines the access to 
information. 
 
A. Substantive Legal Issues: Changes in the EU Acquis? 
In the EU, much discussion around ACTA has focused on the question of 
whether ACTA differs from existing EU law and will consequently require 
changes of EU secondary law. The answer seems likely to be in the 
affirmative. While the final ACTA text has deleted the most controversial 
provisions, including the “three strikes” provision on the liability of Internet 
service providers,157 a substantive comparison with the IPR Enforcement 
Directive158 reveals that ACTA is not entirely in line with EU secondary 
law. 159  Linguistic differences and silences of the IPR Enforcement 
                                                 
157
 Legal Opinion, supra note 6, at ¶ 32. 
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 Directive 2004/48/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195/16) 
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Directives make a final assessment of compatibility dependent on 
interpretation.160 
First, with respect to civil enforcement (analyzed above in Section I-B-2 of 
this paper), one issue concerns whether the ACTA criteria for damages, 
referring to the value of the goods or services concerned “measured by the 
market price, or the suggested retail price,”161 is identical to criteria in the 
IPR Enforcement Directive, referring to the “appropriateness of the damage 
to the actual prejudice suffered.” 162  Second, as for border measures 
(analyzed above in Section I-B-3 of this paper) the IPR Customs Regulation 
is limited to counterfeit goods.163 This existing limitation of EU law will be 
difficult to justify with convincing policy considerations in the light of 
ACTA, which applies border measures to all forms of IP rights except for 
patents and undisclosed information.164  
Third, the criminal enforcement of IP rights (discussed above in Section I-
B-4 of this paper) touches within the EU upon complex questions of the 
competence division between the EU and its Member States. Even after the 
entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is not competent to adopt 
general EU criminal law. Its competence in this field remains exceptional. 
However as we will see, the Lisbon Treaty has extended the EU’s criminal 
law competence. Pre-Lisbon, the Commission had already twice 
demonstrated its interest to adopt criminal procedures to enforce IP rights. 
In July 2005, it proposed the adoption of a directive on criminal measures 
aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Second 
Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED2)) to 
supplement the existing directive on the civil enforcement of intellectual 
property (First Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive 
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 ACTA, supra note 3, at art. 9(1).  
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 IPR Enforcement Directive, supra note 158, at art. 13.  
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 Council Regulation 1383/2003, art. 2(1), 2003 O.J. (L 196/7) (customs action 
against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the 
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 See infra Part. I.B.1 (discussing the scope of IP rights covered by border measures); 
but see Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Concerning Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, COM (2011) 
285 final, available at 
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ounterfeit_piracy/legislation/com285_en.pdf (approved by the European Parliament on 
July 3, 2012, with amendments available at, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-
2012-0272+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN).   
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(IPRED1)).165 Originally, the existing IPRED1 had also included criminal 
sanctions, but in its hasty adoption, this controversial part was omitted. In 
September 2010 and after much criticism, the Commission decided to 
withdraw its proposal for the IPRED2 and hence its second attempt to adopt 
criminal enforcement procedures for IP rights.166 Main points of criticism 
have been that the directive did not take a sufficiently differentiated 
approach to criminal enforcement of IP rights and that civil enforcement 
may prove sufficiently effective.167  ACTA could be accused of taking a 
similarly insufficiently differentiated approach. Article 23(3) of ACTA for 
instance allows for open-ended criminal measures for “unauthorized 
copying of cinematographic works” at public performances (“camming”).168 
Article 23(4) of ACTA extends this to aiding and abetting of such acts.169 
Post-Lisbon Article 83(2) TFEU vests the EU with the competences to 
adopt minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions 
essential for ensuring the effectiveness of a harmonized EU policy.170 This 
provision vests the EU with the competence to adopt criminal measures to 
enforce IP rights. And even though the Commission states in the 
explanatory memorandum on ACTA that it “has opted not to propose that 
the European Union exercise its potential competence in the area of criminal 
enforcement,”171 this self-restraint does not change the competence division 
and is not binding for the future. On the contrary, in light of the repeated 
pre-Lisbon attempts to adopt criminal enforcement measures for IP rights 
and in light of the EU’s recently expressed intention to use the new EU 
criminal law competence under Article 83(2) TFEU to ensure effective 
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implementation of EU policies in general172 it seems reasonable to expect 
further action of the Commission in this field. 
Finally, one of the most controversial issues under EU law has been the 
enforcement in the digital environment in Article 27 of ACTA. The 
discussion surrounding ACTA has focused in particular on the rules 
governing the potential responsibilities of third parties, such as the online 
service providers, and matters of data protection. Recently, the European 
Data Supervisor re-stated that the scope of the proposed enforcement 
measures in Article 27 of ACTA was still perceived to be unfair, provisions 
on competent authorities with injunctive powers were too vague and 
voluntary enforcement cooperation was in excess of what could be allowed 
under EU law.173 Indeed, Article 27 of ACTA not only refers repeatedly to 
the limits imposed by the laws and regulations of the Parties but also uses 
the word “may” and remains therefore voluntary. 174  What differs is the 
evaluation of the significance of voluntary measures. While the European 
Data Supervisor identified a problem, the legal service of the European 
Parliament concluded that “[s]everal of the enforcement provisions are of a 
non-mandatory nature and do therefore not set out any legal obligations of 
the Parties which would be contrary to fundamental rights.”175 Similarly, the 
Commission pointed out that it was possible to implement ACTA 
compatibly with EU law, and that EU law always provides the necessary 
safeguards and conditionality clauses, by being subject to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, due process and proportionality.176 This view of the 
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Commission is the subject of much academic critique in particular.177 While 
there remains an artificiality or circularity to this viewpoint, however, in so 
far as it suggests that simple recourse to fundamental safeguard clauses 
provides the appropriate safeguards by themselves, purely legally the 
position of the European Parliament and the Commission remains correct. 
Since the Parties are not obliged to implement provisions that are worded as 
“Parties may,” other Parties cannot enforce such provisions. However, it 
remains highly questionable whether the Union should sign and endorse any 
such measures if it considers them as incompatible with the standards of 
fundamental rights protected under EU law. 
ACTA remains open for interpretation on points that are highly relevant for 
criminal enforcement. One example is the criminalization of personal use. 
The European Parliament set out in its position April 25, 2007 on the 
proposal for a new IPR Enforcement Directive that acts “carried out by 
private users for personal and not-for-profit purposes” should not be part of 
the scope of the new directive.178 As noted above, the acts “on a commercial 
scale” within the meaning of ACTA includes “at least those carried out as 
commercial activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage.”179 This is not identical but from the wording acts for “personal 
purpose” should not fall under “acts carried out on a commercial scale.” The 
issue of whether “indirect economic or commercial advantage” might cover 
acts “not-for-profit purpose” is less clear. Yet, a sensible reading of 
“commercial scale” and “commercial advantage” would come to the same 
conclusion.180 However, the assessment of the ACTA provisions as broad 
and ambiguous and the concern about potentially resulting issues of 
interpretation appears to be a more widely shared.181 This is related to the 
secrecy surrounding the negotiations of ACTA, which will be the focus of 
the next subsection. Publicly available information on the negotiations, such 
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as travaux preparatoire 182  and/or position papers would be helpful to 
establish an accepted interpretation of some of the ACTA provisions. 
These four points we have highlighted here give rise to the overall question 
of whether ACTA changes the EU acquis. On November 24, 2010, the 
European Parliament adopted for instance a resolution on ACTA and 
emphasized that “any agreement reached by the EU on ACTA must comply 
fully with the acquis.”183 The use of the term acquis itself is ambiguous. 
Commonly acquis is defined as the accumulated legislation, legal acts, and 
court decisions, which together constitute the body of European Union law; 
it comprises both primary and secondary EU law. 184  Compliance with 
primary law is a requirement for the compatibility of international 
agreements with EU law. 185  It is not a requirement that international 
agreements comply with EU secondary law. The Court of Justice when 
ruling under Article 218(11) TFEU on the legality of ACTA will not control 
whether the adoption of ACTA will require changes to EU secondary 
legislation.186 In the hierarchy of norms within the EU as it is understood by 
the Court of Justice, international agreements rank above EU secondary law 
and can hence require changes to acts of the institutions. Therefore, as a 
matter of formal legal hierarchy, it should be recalled that there is no 
problem for an international agreement to change existing EU secondary 
law. The issue is rather how should this international agreement-making 
power be exercised – particularly in the light of the fact that it can depart 
from rules adopted with support of the European Parliament under the 
ordinary legislative procedure.  
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B. The Procedure: Secrecy in Action 
1.  European Parliament Shifting from Opposition to Responsibility? 
The Lisbon Treaty has extended the European Parliament’s powers under 
the “ordinary” procedure for the conclusion of international agreements in 
Article 218 TFEU. 187  This is well known, at least since the European 
Parliament’s demonstration of power in the context of the conclusion of the 
SWIFT agreement in 2010. However, the Council remains arguably the 
most powerful institution: it authorizes the opening of negotiations, adopts 
negotiating directives, authorizes the signing, and concludes international 
agreements. In principle (subject to exceptions), the Council acts by 
qualified majority. As to the involvement of the European Parliament, it is 
important to distinguish between the initiation and negotiation stage on the 
one hand and the signing and conclusion stage on the other. The European 
Parliament is not formally involved in the negotiations, apart from having 
the right to be informed during all stages of the procedure. 188   At the 
conclusion stage, the European Parliament can be involved in two ways: 
consultation and consent.189 
The right to be informed, in combination with the Parliament’s powers at 
the conclusion stage, has introduced certain “political safeguards.” It is only 
rational to take account of the European Parliament’s comments and 
opinions before the agreement reaches the conclusion stage. This is also 
acknowledged in the Framework Agreement on Relations between the 
European Parliament and the Commission.190 Involvement of the European 
Parliament at the negotiation stage would better represent the rationale of 
Article 218 TFEU. If the European Parliament was fully and actively 
involved at an earlier stage, for instance when the negotiation mandate and 
directives are drawn up, it would be placed in a governing role rather than in 
the role of the opposition. Parliament would be forced to find constructive 
solutions. By contrast, during the ACTA negotiations, the European 
Parliament had very little influence until the very end, even after the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force. This places the European Parliament in the 
position of an obstructionist, with the only chance to veto the agreement if it 
disagrees with the final draft. The latter, however, breeds mistrust between 
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the European Parliament and the Commission and Council, as well as 
between the EU and its external negotiation partners. This notion is 
particularly important in light of the fact that otherwise the Council could, 
within the hierarchy of norms of the European legal order, negotiate a 
change of the Union acquis externally, without input of the European 
Parliament. Should this occur, the European Parliament could then bring a 
case to the Court of Justice or flatly refuse consent at the conclusion stage. 
The greatest strength and influence of a parliament is not consent or 
rejection, but deliberation in a search for a majority. 
2. Access to Information  
The European Parliament adopted on March 10, 2010, a resolution on the 
transparency and state of play of the ACTA negotiations, in which it 
expressed its concerns and called for public and parliamentary access to 
information.191 It considers the lack of transparency “at odds with the letter 
and spirit of the TFEU,” and criticized the fact that no legal basis was 
established prior to the negotiations, nor was approval for the negotiating 
mandate sought.192 
The lack of transparency in negotiating international agreements, along with 
the difficulties of the European Parliament and the public to access relevant 
information, has similarly been the focus of a recent case in the General 
Court -the case of Sophie in ‘t Veld.193  The Sophie in’ t Veld I case is 
informative on the interpretation of the right of access to information; 
Sophie in ‘t Veld brought a parallel action against the Commission 
regarding ACTA, Sophie in ‘t Veld II. 194  The Sophie in ‘t Veld I case 
involved access to the opinion of the Council’s Legal Service concerning a 
recommendation from the Commission to the Council to authorize the 
opening of negotiations between the EU and the U.S., for an international 
agreement to make available to the U.S. Treasury Department financial 
messaging data as a tool to prevent and combat terrorism and terrorist 
financing (the SWIFT agreement). 195  As a Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP), Sophie in ‘t Veld relied on the Transparency Regulation 
1049/2001 for her request, and consequently, the discussion was framed as 
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whether the refusal was justified under the exceptions within the meaning of 
Article 4 of the regulation.196 The General Court previously ruled in the API 
case, holding that “the mere fact that a document concern[ed] an interest 
protected by an exception cannot justify application of that exception.197 
Such application may, in principle, be justified only if the institution has 
previously assessed… whether access to the document would specifically 
and actually undermine the protected interest…”198 In Sophie in ‘t Veld, the 
General Court shed further light on this holding in the context of Article 
4(1)(a) of Regulation 1049/2001 on the protection of public interest in the 
field of international relations.199 Judicial review of a provision with such “a 
complex and delicate nature,” and “having regard in particular to the 
singularly sensitive and essential nature of the protected interest…the 
review of legality must be limited to verifying whether the procedural rules 
and the duty to state reasons have been complied with, whether the facts 
have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error of 
assessment of the facts or a misuse of powers.”200  The General Court’s 
analysis led to partial annulment of the Council decision denying access to 
justice because the Council had not established the risk of a threat to the 
public interest in the field of international relations concerning the 
undisclosed parts of the document relating to the legal basis.201  
Considering an argument of the applicant, the General Court further 
discussed the legislative nature of the agreement, and the question of 
whether the Council was acting in its legislative capacity. 202  The Court 
stated “initiating and conducting negotiations in order to conclude an 
international agreement fall, in principle, within the domain of the 
executive.203 Moreover, public participation in the procedure relating to the 
negotiation and the conclusion of an international agreement is necessarily 
restricted, in view of the legitimate interest in not revealing strategic 
elements of the negotiations. 204  Thus, the General Court held that the 
Council was not acting in its legislative capacity.205 This does not, however, 
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exclude the idea that ACTA impacts the EU acquis. Indeed, the General 
Court explained that the principle of transparency is applicable “especially 
where a decision authorising [sic] the opening of negotiations involves an 
international agreement which may have an impact on an area of the 
European Union’s legislative activity.”206 As explained above, international 
agreements, while complying with the European Treaties, can change the 
acquis. Essentially, this means that through what is executive action in 
principal (initiating and conducting negotiations), the change of legislative 
decisions can be largely predetermined, and the European Parliament can 
only use a veto, rather than influence the course of the discussion or the 
framing of the subject matter earlier on. Further, the decision under the 
Lisbon Treaty to strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the 
conclusion (albeit not negotiation) of international agreements, where a field 
requires the ordinary legislative procedure internally (Article 218(6)(a)(v) 
TFEU), can be read as a reaction to the increasingly broad and detailed 
nature of international agreements, which govern and regulate the legal 
position of individuals in the same way as internal legislation.207 In this 
regard, it is contended that the European Parliament has reached the height 
of its empowerment in the international treaty-making field of the EU.208 
While having grudgingly accepted the latest EU-U.S. Passenger Name 
Records Agreement, the European Parliament “show[ed] its legal teeth” in 
the case of both SWIFT and ACTA.209 
Sophie in ‘t Veld brought on a second action for annulment, which is still 
pending, this time against the Commission’s decision to refuse full access to 
documents concerning the negotiations of ACTA – likewise requested 
pursuant to the transparency regulation.210 The MEP first alleged that the 
Commission failed to explain why access was refused; second, the 
Commission considered Article 4(4) of the transparency regulation as an 
exception, while it is in fact a procedural rule on the consultation of third 
parties; and third, it misapplied Article 4(1)(a), the exception for the 
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protection of the Union’s public interest, as regards external relations.211 If 
the previously discussed Sophie v. in ‘t Veld I case concerning SWIFT gives 
any indication of the General Court’s general approach to the openness of 
international treaty negotiations, the applicant has a good case. 
Two reasons have been offered justifying the secrecy surrounding ACTA.212 
First, confidentiality is a common and necessary component in the 
negotiation of trade agreements.213 The problem here is that ACTA does not 
focus on trade.214 Rather, it sets out detailed rules on the enforcement of IP 
rights, including border controls and enforcement in the digital 
environment.215 These measures could only, by extension, be considered to 
influence trade.216 Indeed, the opinion of the Legal Service of the European 
Parliament concluded “ACTA is an agreement limited to IPR 
enforcement.”217 It further establishes its own enforcement body, the ACTA 
Committee. Each of these points are different from a trade agreement, such 
as the TRIPS, which requires only general legal measures of 
implementation.218 Second, it has been argued that the confidentiality was 
not harmful because ACTA did not aim at changing existing law.219 Yet, as 
we have seen above, certain ACTA provisions will require further 
interpretation before the decision can be made on whether they change the 
scope of existing EU secondary law. Others, however, will do so with 
certainty at least in certain respects. The European Parliament’s concern that 
the EU acquis might be affected by ACTA was clearly expressed through its 
repeated emphasis that the Commission must respect the EU acquis in the 
negotiation of international agreements.220  This concern itself should be 
enough to engage in discussion with the Parliament. In light of this, the 
secrecy surrounding the fact that negotiations were conducted seems to be 
lacking justification. It also raises the question regarding what actors are 
involved in shaping the secret negotiations. The United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) discussed content and drafts with “the upper crust of 
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private industry.” 221  The report written for the Directorate-General for 
External Policies of the European Parliament voiced concerns about whether 
public interest groups had the same access.222 
Executive secrecy, particularly in the area of external relations, is the rule 
rather than the exception. Access to document rules, such as the 
transparency regulation, allow not only a certain amount of information but 
also make clear that open government is a fundamental principle that can 
only be restricted for good reasons. Efficiency or convenience is not part of 
the exceptions in Article 4 of the transparency regulation. The release of the 
ACTA “transparency catalogue” by the Commission, outlining in detail its 
negotiation process and all interested parties, represents a significant 
success. 223   However, it follows a defensive discursive process, where 
initially the Commission was antagonistic in its approach to the Parliament. 
Subsequently, the Commission was forced to issue a document purporting to 
rebut the “myths surrounding ACTA,” 224  as well as a transparent and 
defensive information catalogue on its website. The Commission was the 
subject of adverse legal commentary for its failure to negotiate with 
transparency satisfactorily. 225  The European Parliament was particularly 
dissatisfied with this evolving state of affairs226 and released legal opinions 
supporting its viewpoint.227 These legal opinions were not limited to adverse 
views on transparency and secrecy practices, but also discussed the 
substantive content of ACTA.  
The current state of litigation remains far from satisfactory because the laws 
do not force advances in openness in international treaty negotiations. The 
belated voluntary disclosure in the case of ACTA is quite significant. 
Additionally, ACTA has ironically engendered a high level of transparency 
between the institutions after much inter-institutional rivalry. The inter-
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institutional dynamic in international relations remains embryonic and 
underscores the developing nature of EU foreign policy.  
 
III. ACTA AND U.S. LAW 
The legal issues surrounding ACTA in the U.S., legal order form a useful 
comparative study for a number of reasons. The U.S. was one of the key 
initial parties to the ACTA negotiations and signed ACTA in late 2011.228 
Certain similarities exist in U.S. law with respect to the legal controversies 
that ACTA has generated in the EU, as well as significant domestic 
constitutional questions concerning the reception of international law. These 
similarities include, inter alia, the authority to enter and implement ACTA, 
the legal effects of ACTA on U.S. law, and the secrecy with which the U.S. 
ACTA negotiations were conducted and are considered here accordingly. 
 
A. On Procedure 
1. The Authority to Enter and Implement ACTA by an Executive 
Agreement  
The USTR maintained from the outset of U.S. negotiations that ACTA was 
a “sole-executive agreement” negotiated under the President’s authority, 
was consistent with existing U.S. law and did not require the enactment of 
implementing legislation. 229 Accordingly, the U.S. Trade Ambassador, 
Ronald Kirk, signed ACTA in October 2011.230 Thus, controversy exists 
concerning the implementation of ACTA without legislative authority, as 
well as the question of the authority to enter a binding international 
agreement without congressional approval.231 There are three constitutional 
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mechanisms to bind the U.S. to international agreements: (1) by invocation 
of the Treaty clause of the Constitution, submitting the agreement to a two-
thirds vote of the Senate; (2) through a congressional-executive agreement 
in which the agreement is either approved of beforehand or approved after 
the fact by a majority of both Houses of Congress; or (3) as a sole executive 
agreement governing matters delegated by Article II of the Constitution to 
the President.232  
As Laurence Tribe states, U.S. Presidents have long maintained that they 
may conclude executive agreements without “paying heed to the procedural 
niceties” that govern formal treaties, in particular the requirement of 
obtaining the support of two-thirds of the Senate.233 Currently, the precise 
scope of the President’s power to conclude international agreements without 
the consent of the Senate is unresolved. Tribe also cautions that the notion 
that executive agreements know no constitutional bounds “proves equally 
bankrupt.”234 Instead, there may be a species of international accord that 
may take the form of a treaty, but are considered an executive agreement. 
The U.S. Constitution is silent as to how the nation may enter agreements 
that do not rise to the level of treaties. Treaty making in the U.S. is in 
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comparative terms unique and extraordinary. 235  For example, U.S. 
Constitutional law is distinct in requiring a supermajority legislature vote to 
approve treaties, and it is in a minority of Countries in the world to exclude 
a part of the legislature from international law making that is usually 
involved in domestic law making. In more extreme cases, a small handful of 
countries combine the latter feature with a rule that makes treaties 
automatically a part of domestic law. However, the procedures that dictate 
how treaties are dealt with in U.S. law is described as being both dualist and 
monist, and, at least, remarkably complex.236 U.S. courts pay considerably 
more regard to arguments of their government in amicus curiae briefs about 
the status of international law and to the intentions of the parties, than to the 
texts of treaties. Hence, while executive agreements override State law, it is 
not always easy for the U.S. government to convince state governments and 
legislatures that they are obliged to comply with them. 
The use of a sole-executive agreement for the adoption of ACTA by the 
USTR has resulted in much controversy; if ACTA were characterized as a 
treaty as opposed to an agreement, it would need approval of two-thirds of 
the Senate before it could be ratified. Thus, the controversy rested on 
whether U.S. constitutional procedures required submission of ACTA to the 
U.S. Senate for approval as a treaty, or to Congress as a congressional-
executive agreement, or whether the President can adopt the pact as a sole 
executive agreement requiring only the President’s approval.237 Recently, 
Harold Koh, the U.S. State Department Legal Advisor, has notably 
described ACTA as a legally binding international agreement.238 This use of 
nomenclature has fuelled further controversy about the legal formula 
employed by the U.S. as to ACTA. 
Firstly, it is argued that Congress has effectively been circumvented for the 
duration of the ACTA negotiation process.239 Secondly, the President has 
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been suggested to lack independent constitutional authority over intellectual 
property.240 Jack Goldsmith and Lawrence Lessig assert that the claim of 
such unilateral powers was usually reserved for insignificant matters and 
that the Supreme Court had not clarified the limits on such powers. 241 
Rather, such powers were usually drawn from either express powers or 
historical powers.242 Thirdly, the U.S. Constitution explicitly gives primacy 
of authority over intellectual property to Congress.243 Accordingly, it has 
been contended that ACTA would effectively usurp congressional authority 
over intellectual property policy and that Act had failed to explicitly 
incorporate current congressional policy, in the areas of damages and 
injunctions.244 Fourthly, it has been argued that, as a result, the agreement 
could complicate legislative efforts to solve wider policy dilemmas in the 
area of copyright. The USTR, however, claimed that ACTA was fully 
consistent with existing U.S. law in the area of damages and injunctive 
relief and claimed that the U.S. had discretion with respect to the scope of 
implementation, considered further above here. Fifthly, it has been 
contended by a group of scholars making submissions to the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Finance in 2012 that a participatory public law-making 
process was required: “[i]t is clear that other ACTA negotiating parties – 
including the EU, Australia, Mexico, and others—are treating ACTA as a 
binding international agreement requiring legislative ratification under 
constitutional standards similar to our own. We encourage you to demand 
the same element of public process in our own country.”245   
As such, the desire for legislative participation and for a different legal 
instrument, other than an agreement, indicates how executive-dominated the 
ACTA negotiations have been in U.S. law. However, it is worth noting that 
many express concerns that the legal basis of ACTA may never be 
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examined under U.S. law, on account of the political question doctrine.246 
This is in contrast to EU law, where the compatibility of ACTA itself has 
been referred to the Court of Justice, to consider competence and 
fundamental rights questions. By its own rules of procedure, the Court of 
Justice may consider the legal basis of ACTA.247 In this way, we witness a 
significant difference between EU and U.S. law.  
2. Legal Authority in U.S. IP Law for ACTA? 
Koh, the U.S. State Department Legal Advisor, has contended in 
correspondence to a member of Congress that ACTA was negotiated in 
response to previous express Congressional calls for international 
cooperation to enhance enforcement of intellectual property rights.248 Koh 
relied upon the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual 
Property Act of 2008 (PRO-IP Act of 2008), 249  as a basis for the 
development of ACTA, which called for the Executive Branch to develop 
and implement a plan aimed at eliminating international counterfeiting and 
infringement networks and to work with other countries to establish 
international standards and policies. Notably, Koh argued that the Obama 
Administration was able to rely on existing U.S. intellectual property law 
for implementation of ACTA – including the Copyright Act 1976, the 
Lanham Act, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act –as to fulfill all of 
its obligations as a party to ACTA with respect to civil remedies, border 
enforcement mechanism, and criminal penalties for certain intellectual 
property offenses.250 
Legal scholars have sought to dispute this characterization through the Act 
of 2008, arguing that it was not temporally possible. They stated in a letter 
to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee that: 
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“… The latest communication on this issue, from Department of State 
Legal Advisor Harold Koh to Senator Wyden, abandoned the Sole-
Executive Agreement justification for ACTA and instead described the 
agreement as an ex ante Congressional-Executive Agreement. ACTA 
was authorized, the letter claims, by Section 8113(a)(6) of the 2008 
PRO-IP Act….. The plain language of Section 8113(a) of the PRO-IP 
Act1 does not authorize USTR to bind the U.S. to any international 
agreement. PRO-IP Act cannot be an ex ante authorization for ACTA 
because it was not temporally ex ante… The ACTA negotiation began 
in 2007. PRO-IP was not passed until 2008, and was passed at a time 
Congress was being told that ACTA would be entered as a Sole-
Executive Agreement – requiring no Congressional approval at all. The 
administration did not seek, and Congress has not given, ex ante 
authorization to bind the U.S. to ACTA. We thus conclude that the 
Administration currently lacks a means to Constitutionally enter ACTA 
without ex post Congressional approval.” (emphasis added)251  
 
However, this dispute remains academic in light of the signing of ACTA by 
the U.S. and the unlikely consideration of this issue by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Nonetheless, this shows how legal authority in existing IP law to 
enter ACTA is contestable. 
3. Effects on U.S. Law in Absence of Congressional Approval 
Goldsmith and Lessig, assert that in the absence of congressional approval, 
ACTA raises serious constitutional questions affecting domestic law. 252 
They argue that the non-criminal portions of ACTA, that contemplate 
judicial enforcement, could override inconsistent state and federal law.253 
Also, they suggest ACTA could invalidate State law that conflicts with its 
general policies,254 and that a judicial canon, requiring courts to interpret 
ambiguous federal laws to avoid violations of international obligations, 
entails that courts would construe ambiguities in federal laws on intellectual 
property, telecom policy, and related areas to conform to ACTA.255  
Controversy exists in U.S. law concerning the U.S. reception of 
international law effectively an internal perspective. It provides a 
comparative study of the reception of international law, given the 
contentions among U.S. and EU officials that ACTA does not alter existing 
copyright law in either jurisdiction.256 In the U.S. legal order, ACTA has 
been an executive-dominated matter, excluding larger legislative 
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participation. It concerns less of a rights-based discourse than in EU law. 
Transparency appears to have been achieved, similar to the position 
prevailing now in the EU However, the U.S. Supreme Court is not likely to 
consider the legality of the instrument used to negotiate ACTA in the short 
term at least, putting aside the most controversial aspects of the U.S. ACTA 
affair.257  
4. Secrecy  
The exclusion or circumvention of Congress in relation to the negotiation 
and ratification of ACTA has been a major bone of contention in the U.S. on 
many levels, both substantively and procedurally regarding content and 
transparency, thereby mirroring EU law. For example, the USTR has been 
criticized extensively for the secretive manner in which it conducted ACTA 
negotiations, and it is alleged that the USTR had not held a single public 
meeting on the ACTA text and had blocked public release of the updated, 
evolving draft text.258 By early 2010, a leaked document draft was finally 
released.259 Some U.S. scholars maintain that the secrecy surrounding the 
negotiations was unwarranted, as ACTA did not relate to any standard 
definition of “national security” under U.S. law, especially given that the G8 
had referenced the ACTA agreement as a “new international framework” in 
International IP law. 260  Moreover, David Levine contrasts the perceived 
secrecy surrounding the adoption of ACTA with the relatively open 
domestic process surrounding the introduction of the controversial U.S. 
SOPA and PIPA Acts. 261   Levine proposed that international IP 
policymaking processes might be open to greater public scrutiny by creating 
a qualified public right to “foreign relations” national security information, 
which he alleged was systematically withheld from the public during the 
U.S. ACTA negotiations.262 In fact, the USTR subsequently released draft 
and final texts of ACTA on its website in April and October 2010, and a 
cursory analysis of the website now reveals a highly transparent and 
comprehensive analysis of ACTA in the U.S. For example, similar to EU 
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law, a factsheet was released by the USTR Executive office, as well as 
viewpoints of the Office on ACTA, resulting in considerable transparency, 
and perhaps mirroring the EU position. However, the form of legal 
instruments used to adopt ACTA remains the thorny question in U.S. law, 
whereby Congress had no input into the adoption of the text, and thereby 
diverging considerably from EU law.  
 
B. On Substance: Consistency with U.S. Law 
The USTR has claimed that ACTA is consistent with U.S. copyright, patent, 
and trademark laws, especially with regards to injunctive relief and 
damages. 263  It emphasized how ACTA allowed parties to determine in 
certain instances the scope of implementation. The USTR stated that 
injunctive relief in existing U.S. copyright law was consistent with and 
implemented ACTA: 
“… injunctive relief as provided for in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (17 USC §512j) and other provisions of U.S. law is 
consistent with and implements the obligations of the ACTA. 
References in Article 27.4 of the ACTA to expeditious disclosure of 
information do not oblige the United States to take additional action to 
compel such disclosure.”264 
 
Similarly, U.S. law regarding damages in patent disputes implemented the 
relevant provisions of the ACTA: “… ACTA specifies that a party may 
exclude patents and protection of undisclosed information from the 
obligations in Chapter II, Section 2 (Civil Enforcement). The United States 
will ensure that its approach to implementing these and all other ACTA 
obligations is fully consistent with U.S. law.”265  However, sas outlined 
above, some fear the impact of ACTA on congressional powers in the field 
of intellectual property in the future. The controversy about criminal 
enforcement penalties seems less of an issue in the U.S. than under EU law. 
The Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of 
Intellectual Property Act of 2011, (PIPA)266 and the Stop Online Piracy Act 
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(SOPA), 267  both introduced in 2011, represent far-reaching efforts to 
prevent breaches of US copyright law, although later versions have been 
watered down considerably.  While analysis of the content thereof is outside 
the scope of the current work, overall, they require operators of the 
Internet’s addressing (DNS) system to block access to “foreign infringing 
sites” that traffic illegally in copyrighted content and are highly 
controversial on account of their impact on internet freedom.268 However, as 
outlined above, some suggest that the openness of their legislative adoption 
process, however controversial, contrasts considerably with the introduction 
of ACTA. These developments indicate the shifting parameters of US IP 
law but perhaps also emphasize the particularities of US engagement with 
International law.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The impetus towards ACTA started from the moment that TRIPS was 
adopted in 1994, which brought divided IP exporters and importers into one 
single multilateral treaty by complex bargaining within the WTO 
agreements. 269   The dissatisfaction of developed states towards TRIPS, 
especially its domestic enforcement provisions, resulted in a series of FTAs, 
involving the U.S. and the EU, which have included robust domestic 
enforcement provisions, including those concerning IP rights infringements 
carried out on the Internet. While developed states have demonstrated their 
efforts from 2005 to discuss enforcement agendas at the multilateral TRIPS 
Council, their attempts did not, unsurprisingly, attract developing states. The 
resort to the plurilateral forum to the exclusion of developing states has 
subsequently led to the successful adoption of the text of ACTA. The 
restricted involvement of legislative organs at the regional and domestic 
levels has also facilitated the adoption and signing processes. In the U.S., 
the executive-dominated negotiation of ACTA resulted in disquiet. However, 
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the conclusion of the treaty, which was made possible by the selection of 
participants, invited international, regional, and domestic criticisms against 
ACTA, which now almost completely overshadow the fruit of the 
plurilateral negotiations. Many of the criticisms are justified. On substance, 
ACTA aims to establish robust domestic procedures without making 
distinctions between different kinds of IP rights. 270  ACTA pursues the 
greater protection of IP right holders against competing social demands, and 
it does so with limited safeguards. As is the case of TRIPS, ACTA is merely 
to oblige or facilitate parties to “have the authority” to take enforcement 
procedures, and not to oblige them to “exercise” authority.271  Yet this does 
not diminish the concerns over ACTA. The conferral of the authority simply 
increases the anxiety as to the extent to which customs and judicial 
authorities would actually exercise their power, either in response to the 
requests by the right holders, or acting on their own initiatives. 
On the treaty-making procedure, there is, of course, nothing to prevent states 
and international organizations from concluding treaties on IP rights 
protection on a bilateral or plurilateral basis. 272  In the case of ACTA, 
however, it does not readily make sense to draft an anti-counterfeiting treaty 
without certain key countries, where counterfeiting and piracy practices 
remain widespread, such as in China and India. This question could only be 
resolved by considering: first, ACTA might have in part be used—just like 
many other international treaties—to create a domestic political justification 
to introduce robust IP rights protection. Second, the use of a plurilateral 
forum can be understood by situating ACTA as one of the intermediary 
steps to reform international standards on the domestic enforcement of IP 
rights. 273  Namely, ACTA could serve as a framework for the future 
determination of more detailed rules, leaving short- and long-term effects on 
the multilateral rule-making on IP protection beyond ACTA.274 In this sense, 
the prospect of ACTA carries wider implications not only on this treaty 
itself, but also wider TRIPS-plus provisions, which would continue to be 
raised in FTA negotiations and at the TRIPS Council.  
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The political setbacks surrounding ACTA especially in the EU and the U.S. 
reflect the fact that the international treaty-making process underestimated 
the width and complexity of governmental and non-governmental interests 
that the domestic enforcement of IP rights now attracts both at the national, 
regional, and global levels.275 ACTA should also be seen as the epitome of 
international treaty-making which tends to discount its impact on domestic 
actors, including private individuals. ACTA or other international 
agreements on domestic enforcement necessarily require amendments to 
existing domestic law. Without the involvement of legislative organs at the 
European and national levels, such international agreements ultimately find 
political and legal obstacles when they are translated into the regional and 
domestic legal orders. 
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